BAGHDAD, Iraq – A mother comforts her child as United States military personal attempt to capture a local man who was found building IEDs in his small 10 by 10 apartment.
Scenes like these captivate audiences all across the world, especially in America where public perception is largely built upon 15 second sound bites and images. The public is irreverent when it comes to most matter, especially war, as evident by the war in Vietnam. Popular opinion experiences paradigm shifts each time the media blasted photos of dead bodies or negative stories.
The public’s opinion only matter so much. A society is often judged by the literature it leaves and not by polls. In this regards, the academics has failed to give a clear and precise picture of the Iraqi war. When examining text books and scholarly journals, it is clear that only one side of the narrative is being advanced.
This narrative suggests some basic points, and most of the academic literature support and elaborate on these points.
- Bush invaded Iraq for oil
- The Invasion was a mistake
- All is doom and gloom
A leading academic Charles Hauss has been a strong advocate of this agenda for several years. His text books are often the pillars of Political Science in today’s Political Science departments.
History and The Hauss Model
In his narrative, Hauss points out that the Iraqis are the real victims of the invasion, as they have suffered anywhere from 30,000 to 300,000 causalities and it will take years for a legitimate government to take control. Violence and opposition emerged shortly after the initial invasion due to the historical hostilities and opposition against the occupation.
Although the Bush Administration affirms that Iraq is once again a sovereign nation, polls indicate Iraqis believe the U.S. still maintains control. The U.S. insurgency intended to collapse Saddam and the Baath party’s control led to the widespread collapse of authority within the country. Removal of individuals associated with the Baath party meant removing the majority of those with government experience.
The southern Shiite supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr were the first to rebel; they supported neither the U.S occupation in Iraq nor the Baath regime under Saddam’s control. He formed the Al-Madhi Army intended to install a shadow government to turn the country into a Muslim state. The Army numbered about 20,000 loyal members who engaged in violent conflict in southern Shiite cities regardless of an arms shortage. Suspicions that Iran was assisting the Insurrectionist complicated matters further. In 2004, the Al-Sadr as well as other Insurrectionist groups agreed to join the official police and security services. Since they have not done so, relations between the group and authorities have become further strained.
The insurgency was mostly based among Arab Sunnis in the central Iraq where the population overwhelming supported the Baath party. Suspicion that members of the Baath party were responsible for the insurgencies have been cleared since those associated with the Baath party have been removed, killed, or arrested. After the collapse of the Baath party, insurrections have involved violent attacks using explosive devices which are responsible for the deaths of Americans and Iraqis. A similar attack on the U.N. head quarters causing the death of 17 people led to the withdrawal of the majority of U.N. involvement.
In 2007, President Bush approved a surge of over thirty thousand troops headed by General Petraeus due to concerns arisen by insurgent groups claiming to be involved with al-Queda though ties are unconfirmed. Petreaus understood counterinsurgency could take years and that troops would have to fight, maintain order, and rebuild in a short period but, he believed it would be an opportunity to with Iraqis in peace building and reconstruction. Petreaus and his team faced an almost impossible challenge since they were not able to apply their ideas until after three years of an ongoing conflict. The team failed to meet a majority of the benchmarks set forth by the government, after which the President reduced forces.
The U.S. has in the past helped countries such as Germany and Japan quickly build democratic states however there are three distinct differences in the case of Iraq. The societies overwhelming agreed on the need for change from their previous regimes and the further existence of their countries. Occupying forces were also able to build on the support bases of leaders who stayed home during the war. In Iraq’s case, the U.S. relied on leaders that spent the war years in exile. After Saddam’s regime fell, the U.S ruled Iraq through the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was to draft a temporary constitution (representing the three majors ethnic groups) in order to transfer legal sovereignty in 2004. However, there was widespread disapproval among Iraqis who perceived the U.S. to be a colonial power.
The transfer of power occurred but was completely symbolic as the government was established under over 160,000 occupying forces. The regime consists of new puppet leaders that are unable to relate to the people after years of exile. Despite genuine efforts by the new government and President Alawi, the new regime lacks legitimacy and is divided among the three religious and ethnic groups, with Shiites being in the majority. However, the Kurds govern their region as a separate country.
The new government prepared for the free elections in 2005 in which candidates reflected the groups that had come together to represent the three major ethnic and religious groups. The elected government would write a new constitution. The elections were a huge success with 58 percent voter turnout despite the controversies. The Sunni Muslims protested the election to reflect their opposition of the occupation and perhaps due to fear of insurgents. The United Iraqi Alliance, a Shiite coalition won a majority in this as well as the end of the year election to select a permanent government, which was headed by Nouri al-Maliki. The popular party of the Kurds came in second. The parties of groups that boycotted the vote such as the Iraqi Accord Front of the Sunni’s won small percentages of the vote after which Sunnis other have left the UIA.
According to Hassu, Iraq can be considered a failed state, as the new government has established no real authority over the government and the Kurds run their region in the North as an independent country. The south is calmer but government’s authority in Shiite strongholds is questionable and the Sunni triangle is the only area with stability. Moreover, the new government is the result of the occupation and it is widely perceived that the Bush administration failed in its attempt to transfer power to the new regime. The U.S. plans to withdraw troops by 2011, but it is unlikely that the state will strengthen by then.
Iraq has progressively seen an improvement in the overall situation as well as from 2009 to 2010; but the state still faces overwhelming challenges. Improvements have been made in security as attacks by insurgents have decreased. Human rights conditions have seen modest improvements. Public services provided by the government, corruption, and sectarian tensions have remained the same. The number of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries has increased; almost half of the skilled professionals have left the country. Economic development had also decreased. Although vast improvements have not been made, conditions can be viewed positively considering the Iraqi Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior have been responsible for security and implementation of the laws since the 2009 U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement. The military and police both suffer from corruption and sectarian tensions. The 2010 elections were not without their controversies as Iyad Allawi defeated Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who then protested the results. Though he was not able to change the decision, he was permitted to form a coalition government. The future of Iraq depends on the effectiveness of the government and armed forces.
Failures of the Hauss Model
Hauss is very bias, something acadmeic should clearly attempt to avoid. This clearly leaves no room for critical thinking in a academic setting.
One of hte pillars of the arguments advanced by Hauss is that the Iraqis are largly unhappy. However, there is a major distination that an acadic must make to reply on polls. Who is being polled? Are They accurate? Despite these questions, polls will never truly demonstrate the thought of the people.
It is evident that some Iraqis are tired of the process, but Hauss never points of the fact that all major building process are in fact not popular during their time.
For Hauss’, it is easier to see the grief and discuss the tension the women in the first photo faces, rather than discuss the potential out come. Something these gentlemen clearly understand.
In his views of how Iraq became a potentially failed state. He focuses on the U.S. invasion as the primary cause that contributed to the failure of the Iraqi state since the U.S. removed from power all individuals associated with the Baath party. He discusses that Iraq has paid a high cost due to the instability. However, he fails to consider the motives of the U.S. that led to the invasion; rather he chooses to blame the U.S. The Iraqi state may have been stronger before the invasion; however, the Iraqis were suffering due to the brutality and repression of the Baath party. In addition, the Bush administration would not have entered the war under the pretext of Weapons of Mass Destruction, if they did not truly fear Saddam possessed them and the potential transfer of them to terrorist groups. If the WMDs were a false pretext for the war, then the administration could have planted them to prevent widespread criticism of the war, as implied by Hauss.
Hauss efficiently emphasizes that the approach initially taken by the Bush administration, the surge, contributed to the failure of the state by making it more difficult for Petreaus to address the issues with his approach, which may have been more effective. Hauss gives the illusion that the surge in 2005 was a failure that barely achieved a few of its goals. The Fund for Peace, in the 2008-2009 issue on Iraq discusses that the surge was more successful in accomplishing military goals than in its attempt to put in place the political and social reforms necessary to address fundamental issues. However, the reports also mention that the surge produced some improvements such as increased security as well as political and economic progress.
Hauss effectively discusses factors that led to the failure of the Iraqi state including U.S. intervention as the dominant cause. After intervention, the U.S. eliminated the majority of individuals associated with the Saddam regime, leading to the collapse of government authority. He emphasizes that it was necessary to collapse the Saddam regime and government authority since the majority of those holding positions of power were associated with the old regime.
Hauss focuses on the role the United States had in the “failure” of the state of Iraq, but he does not mention other factors that contributes to its “failure.” It is important to note that history, geography, and foreign interference can contribute to the failure of a state, but the state is also responsible for its failure. As in Iraq case, U.S. intervention may have been the catalyst contributing factors of the potential failure but Iraq already had a large degree of government corruption and mismanagement under Saddam’s rule.
Hauss unlike several other sources discussing the topic effectively explains the unique challenges that hinder the rebuilding of the Iraqi state. Iraq is different from other countries that the U.S. has aided in building democratic such as Germany and Japan regimes because the old regimes in those countries were overwhelmingly opposed, the people agreed on a need for change and wanted their country to continue to exist. He discusses the opposition expressed by the Iraqis. Also, the U.S. is forced to rely on politicians who have lost their connection to the people due to years in exile during the Saddam regime. Thus, they are unable to connect to their bases and encourage them to overcome their differences. The clarifications assist the audience in understanding the complexity of the issues surrounding the Iraqi state.
Hauss emphasizes the causes of the underlying tensions among the groups that stand in the way of a stronger Iraqi state, as do my other sources so the reader is able to understand the intensity of problems and the difficulties involved with overcoming them. The Fund for Peace issue on Iraq and Hauss section on Iraq as a Failed State, explain that the tensions between the three major groups emerge from ethnic antagonism, and the Kurds desire for independence. Furthermore, he clarifies the goals of the three dominant divisions. The Shiites aim to turn Iraq into a Muslim state while the Sunnis support the Baath regime. The Kurds on the other hand, desire an independent state. The Fund for Peace report provides additional reasons that intensify the tensions including the conflict over resources such as oil rich lands. In addition, Hauss more effectively explains the depth of the divisions among the three major groups by discussing that there were initially hundreds of groups running candidates in the 2005 elections, which came together to form three major groups reflecting the ethnic and religious divisions. By focusing on the problems brought forth by the political divisions, Hauss makes it clear that one of the major hurdles contributing to the “failure” of the Iraqi state are the distinct divisions of the society, especially the division of the Kurds. The three groups engage in a constant struggle to gain power as they did in the 2005 elections. Perhaps, building Iraq into a democratic state would be more effective if the groups overcame their differences.
While Hauss discusses the political divisions as one of the factors that result in the failure of Iraq, he fails to mention other factors including the economic issues, refugee displacement, and inequalities. The inequalities such as those in distribution of resources contribute to the severity of the tensions. Shiite regions continue to grow faster than Sunni regions due to the inequalities in oil distribution. In Northern Iraq, which has a significant population of Kurds access to the oil resources is significantly compared to the rest of the nation.
Hauss discusses the problems involving sectarian tensions in depth. However, Hauss fail to discuss the several other structural problems that contribute to the failure of the state including environmental problems such as droughts, the refugee’s crisis, displaced persons and a lack of human rights protections. Problems such as murders, assassinations, secret prisons and attacks on civilians have not been addressed appropriately by the government. Iraq also has low economic development considering it holds the world’s third largest oil reserves. The government policies implemented to address the political and economic issues remain ineffective.
Hauss under emphasizes the progress that has been made in Iraq and generally neglects to discuss it. He focuses primarily on the shortcomings through which he suggests that the U.S. involvement in Iraq was a mistake. However, incremental progress was made toward a more stable state in areas including crime and a more legitimate regime since 2007. The progress has been undermined by corruption, sectarian disputes, and violence. In addition, over a majority of Iraqis believe improvements have been made towards internal security, crime protection, overall safety, and free movement compared to very low approval in 2007. While modest advances have been made for all three groups, sectarian tensions are still widespread since the improvements are unequally distributed among Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds who are divided among their ethnic and religious affiliations.
Hauss also underplays the economic boom that is taking place in Iraq. The country has also had economic growth. Despite still being a poor country, the opportunities present to the Iraqis are more generous than ever before. Under the Batth party, only a small percentage of loyal supporters owned vast majority of the business which effectively enabled them to control the country without much opposition. As the popular saying goes, “don’t bite the hand that feeds you,” the Iraqis were unable to challenge the status quo. Since the invasion, there has boom a small economic boom in the country. Iraq Stock Exchange now boasts over 200 companies and averages more than 50 million dollars are traded each session, this is a dramatic increase from the 10 companies that were listed after the invasion. Along with growth in “Stock Street,” there has been an influx of businesses in the local shopping centers. Cafes, restaurants, media stores, bridal shops, and even car retailers are recording record profits. The bridal industry has seen its own boom, in Baghdad wedding are up more than 500% and speeding on these events is also adding major revenue to the local economy. These are all little things which the author does not mention but differentially add to the quality of life for people.
Furthermore, Iraq has progressively moved down in rank in Foreign Policy Magazines Failed State Index. It ranked at #2 in 2007 from which it moved to number five by 2008. In 2009, the country moved to number 6 and then to number 7 in 2010. This shows that it is important to consider the progress Iraq has made as it is moving away from becoming a “failed” state.
Hauss brings attention to one of the important issues preventing Iraq from forming a sovereign government. He claims that the government elected in 2005 was formed under U.S. Occupation and the presence of over 160,000 troops. Therefore, the government may appear to be sovereign, but it will remain a puppet government as long as the U.S. Maintains a presence or influence. He effectively discusses that Iraq is a still a weak state dependent on foreign involvement to maintain the progress it has made. The observation is important because foreign interference is one of the factors that contribute to the failure of a state. This was an issue neglected by some other sources covering the topic. Despite the negative effective foreign intervention has on a state, it is impossible for a state to success in modern times without foreign economic investment and support. Like many of the other points Hauss address, he again fails to see the positive benefits of these particular phenomena.
While Hauss effectively points out one of the hurdles supplementing the “failure” of Iraq, he also undermines one of the points he previously made. He supported the approach advocated by General Petreaus, who believed that rebuilding takes a long period of time. In that sense, the Iraqi government will slowly become sovereign as the U.S. reduces influence and allocates more control to the Iraqi government. Hauss also fails to mention the interference of other states that neighboring Iraq including Syria, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia who will be affected by the future of Iraq.
Hauss fails to discuss that prospects for peace in Iraq are still possible if the country is able to focus and move towards institution-building, political reconciliation and public accountability to achieve it.
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